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Indian Economy for Dummies part
Magic 3%
Three per cent Fiscal Deficit! This is a dream announcement any finance minister of India would love to make. Fiscal deficit is the excess of payments over receipts of the government. The quantum of fiscal deficit in budgets in India is fixed by law — the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) law enacted in 2004. The FRBM law has mandated that, in every budget from 2005, the fiscal deficit should keep coming down till the 3 per cent limit is achieved by budget 2009. But because of the global financial crisis in 2008, the UPA government deferred the target date, justifiably. But with the passage of FRBM law, the rate of fiscal deficit has come to play determinative role on budgets. If a budget moves on the road map to get to 3 per cent fiscal deficit, the finance minister is glorified. If not, he gets demonised.
Also Reead: FRBM Law is Irrational. Amend it
Finance Minister Arun Jaitley must be a worried man. He has promised to reach this magic 3 per cent by 2018. He has pegged the fiscal deficit in the last budget at 3.9 per cent. He has to cut it by at least 40 to 50 basis points in this budget, to get to the target of 3 per cent in 2018. But he sees the reality, which the Reserve Bank does not see or refuses to see. Jaitley sees that the economy is short of money and the corporates are not able to absorb credit and push money down into the economy. He must be pained that it happens when India is seen as an Island of growth by the IMF. He has to infuse cash into the system to strengthen the growth impulses. He needs to recapitalise the banks to get them out of the RBI “watch”. He has to sidestep the march towards fiscal consolidation this year — the other name for cutting fiscal deficit to touch the magic figure of 3 per cent. Moving towards fiscal consolidation now when the economy is starved of money will weaken the national growth drives. Jaitley is clearly in a catch-22 situation. If he goes for fiscal consolidation, growth will be hurt. If he does not, his reputation will be. The number ‘3’ must be tormenting Jaitley.
Story in EU
But how did the figure 3 per cent become an ideal fiscal deficit target? Where did the number 3 emerge in the world of fiscal economics. How did it become the bible verse of budget making in India? The story of how the magic number took birth in fiscal world is interesting. It made its advent in fiscal economics when European nations signed the famous treaty at Maastricht in the Netherlands to form the European Union (EU) as an economic and monetary union in 1992. The treaty named after the university city Maastricht was preparatory for the EU to evolve as a single currency — the Euro — zone from January 2002. A national currency is the product of a politically sovereign state in exercise of what is known as its “seignorage power”. Put in layman’s language, seignorage power is the authority to print nation’s currency or borrow from central bank. In monetary economics, this means creating money if the economy needs it. This power inherent in a nation state saved the US economy in 2008 when the financial system of the US had all but collapsed.
The EU is not a nation state in which this power is inherent. It is a monetary union in which this power rests on a package of critical commitments by the EU members. Critical because if the individual nations do not comply with the package, the Euro will not survive as a common currency. The package agreed stipulated that a member’s inflation should not exceed 1.5 per cent over the average of three member states with the lowest inflation; its public debt should not exceed 60 per cent of GDP, and importantly, its fiscal deficit should not exceed 3 per cent of its GDP. For Eurozone’s survival as one monetary unit, individual nations cannot have inflation, debt, interest or fiscal deficit beyond the agreed band. This is how the figure of ‘3’ made its debut in the fiscal economic discourse.
But how did the Eurozone members honour the deficit figure 3 per cent of GDP? Of the 12 members, 10 breached the 3 per cent limit during the twelve years, 1999 to 2011 — Greece, every year; Portugal,10 years; Italy, eight; France, seven; and the strongest one, Germany, five. Also the ceiling 60 per cent of debt to GDP, inherently linked to fiscal deficit, too was violated by most including France, Spain, Belgium, Austria, Italy, and Germany. The Maastricht treaty, including the 3 per cent rule, is observed more in breach.
Story in India
However, the FRBM fiscal deficit number, identical to the EU number, has become the celebrated principle of judging the budgets and finance ministers in India. The Indian economic establishment, faced with the criticism that it had adopted the EU rate of 3 per cent, devised a convoluted arithmetical formula to get the same number as in Maastricht treaty. It was first reported that the magic figure was recommended by a committee of the finance ministry, but no such recommendation seems available on record. Later, somewhere in 2006, long after FRBM law had adopted the 3 per cent limit, Dr S Rangarajan and Dr Subbarao explained the logic of the magic 3 per cent thus: out of the average financial savings of India, which was 13 per cent, 5 per cent would “go” to private sector corporates and of the balance 8 per cent, 2 per cent would go to public sector undertakings — “leaving” 6 per cent for central and state governments to be appropriated 50:50 between them to fund their deficits. That was how the 3 per cent limit for the central government in FRBM was rationalised. Now interrogate them.
The assumption seems to be that the 5 per cent financial savings would “go” to private corporates on the orders of the economic establishment. What if the private sector refuses to take part of it, like they did in the last few years as evident from the decreasing credit to GDP ratio? Should the government then not step in to fill the gap in investment? Is the basis for fiscal deficit not linked to the extent of credit demand by private corporates rather than by the amount of savings notionally allocable to them? The experts’ explanation has no answers to these questions. Undeniably the 3 per cent limit in FRBM law has no rational nexus with either the causes or the consequences of deficit financing. The philosophy of deficit funding tries to balance between how much deficit financing is needed for the economy to grow and how much of it will not risk inflation. The Anglo-Saxon nations have taught the world about the need for fiscal deficit, without risking inflation, to trigger and sustain growth. In 1963, when Milton Friedman was invited to India, he advised the government to go for a feasible level of deficit financing for growth without inflation. But his view based on his quantity theory of money, which later won Nobel prize in 1976, was rejected by Indian policy makers who derisively called his quantity theory of money as quantity theology of money. Friedman proved right, finally. The Fourth Plan (1969-74) became the victim of serious forex crisis and inflation. Therefore, avoiding fiscal deficit itself could harm.
3% plagiarised
That the FRBM rate of fiscal deficit and the EU rate are identical is therefore no coincidence. The convoluted explanations to justify the FRBM rate which has no rational nexus with the theory of fiscal deficit actually lets the cat out of the bag. The perception that the Maastricht rate was smuggled into the FRBM law and post facto explanations were invented later to plagiarise it as Indian arithmetic, is unavoidable. Given the pressure on not just India, but on the entire developing world till 2008 to follow the West, that India adopted the EU rate should be no surprise. But it is time it is revisited. A point to flag here. The idea of fiscal prudence is not new to India. Many may be surprised to know that, in India, revenue deficit occurred for the first time in 1979-80.
The issue is not about whether deficit financing is good or bad, but how much of it is good and how much is not. Good economics is not about either this or that, but about how much of both. The need for and quantum of fiscal deficit are a country specific issue and even a context specific one. It needs no seer to say that the adoption of the EU number is not only not rational but harms India. Most EU nations breach the magic number because of its unsuitability for their needs. Mandatorily applying such clerically devised ceiling on fiscal deficit is proving harmful to Indian economy. Await the next part to know the harm the irrational 3 per cent rule causes to India.
(to be continued)
(The author is a well-known commentator on economic and political affairs. e-mail: guru@gurumurthy.net
Indian economy for Dummies 1
Indian economy for Dummies part one
In the second of a three-part series on the Indian economy ahead of the presentation of the Union Budget, well-known commentator on political and economic affairs, S Gurumurthy argues that the Indian family’s instinct to save in banks rather than spend at stores, which is similar to that of Japanese families, has insulated the economy from global crises. However, this cultural aspect has not been given due consideration when it comes to policy and budget-making efforts in the country. This, he explains, is due to the Western bias of Indian economists.
Domestic Impulses
Recall the economic discourse in the 1990s when, threatened by a forex crisis and nearly defaulting on its external debts, India liberalised its economy to allow free foreign investment and foreign trade. The nation was told then that as Indians did not save enough, the economy did not generate adequate capital, and therefore foreign investment was needed for growth. Emphasis was also laid on exports and foreign trade as the main drivers of growth. Looking back from the vantage point of 25 years of liberalisation, it is self-evident now that foreign investment has played but only a secondary role in the Indian growth story. The Indian economy grew primarily through domestic savings, which rose from 21 per cent of GDP in 1991-92 to as high as 37 per cent of GDP in 2009 and now hovers around 31 per cent. Domestic capital formation rose from 22 per cent in 1991-92 to a high of over 38 per cent in 2011-12.
Besides, it is not export but household consumption, close to 60 per cent, which was the mainstay of the nation’s growth. (In contrast, household consumption in China is around 36 per cent, which implies the disproportionately high external dependence of China.) Net foreign investment in India during two decades of liberalisation averaged around 3 per cent of national investment. Foreign investment mainly funded external deficit more than development within. Domestic impulses — in terms of both investment and demand — were therefore the core factors in the Indian growth story, the external forces being additives, though not unimportant. The world began taking notice of India as a domestically driven economy. Additionally, the Global Entrepreneur Monitor Study (2002) found that India (18 per cent) was ahead of China (12 per cent) and US (11 per cent) in entrepreneurship. This helped brand India as entrepreneur-led. But the Indian-establishment economists would still underplay the domestic impulses and speak and celebrate only the role of the external drivers in the Indian growth story.
Stable Families
What is often, if not totally, missed in the Indian discourse, and in the budget making, is the undeniable fact that the household sector is the strongest and stablest component of the Indian economy. Family savings rose from 16 per cent of GDP in 1991-92 to a high of 25 per cent in 2009-10. This is because of the relation-based cultural life that marks India out from the contract-based individualist West. Except for a fraction of ultra-westernised Indians, family is not a contract to live together, terminable at will. It is an integrated cultural institution of mutually dependent persons bound by relationships of caring and sharing. It takes care of the elderly and the infirm, the ill and the jobless, which constitutes its propensity to save. In most of the West, family functions have been taken over by the State through social and health security, which, in substance, means nationalising families.
The families being rid of their relational responsibilities, their propensity to save weakened and consequently the household savings in US which was 80 per cent of US national savings in 1960 nosedived to minus 20 per cent in the third quarter of 2006. Savings turned just a subject of personal choice of the atomised individual and ceased to be a cultural, filial responsibility. The sense of duty to the near and dear, more than one’s own rights, which is inherent in Indian family culture acts as the bulwark against the unbridled individualism of the modern West. It needs no seer to say that culturally India belongs to Asia, not Europe or America. As Barry Bosworth of the Brookings Institution wrote, in Asia savings are dynastic, not personal. The idea of a rational economic man, who acts only in his self-interest, does not apply to Asia or India where filial relations undermine self-interest.
As families in the West were nationalised, traditional government functions like water supply, road building and public utilities, began to be privatised. Significantly, in the US, nationalisation of families and privatisation of government went hand in hand from around the late 1970s. Liberal economic policies, largely imported from the US, have not been able to change the cultural behaviour of Indian families. This was brought out in the Economic Survey 2007-8 (see page 3 Table 1.2/para 1.4). The income-consumption-saving for the period 1981-2 to 2007-8, which covered 10 years of command economy and 16 years of liberal economy demonstrated that the ratio of spending to savings declined from 64 per cent in 1991-2 to 58 per cent in 2007-8 — implying that Indian families have defied consumerist trends encouraged by new economic policies. Noting this fact, the Survey says, “The average growth of consumption is slower than that average growth of income primarily because of rising savings rates.” It concludes: “Year to year changes in consumption also suggest that the rise in consumption is more gradual and steady process, as any sharp changes in income tend to get adjusted in savings rate.”
The behavioural model of Indian households has a lesson for policy makers — that is, shopping is not, and cannot become, central to Indian families. But, in the US, as the famous American anthropologist Marshall Sahlins says shopping is the culmination of modernity. When an Indian household gets extra income it does not go straightaway to the shops. It saves rather than spends it. If the Pay Commission report is implemented, it will not cause instant inflation as the RBI governor seems to fear. This cultural differential is missed in the economic discourse and therefore in policy-making in India.
Similar to Japan, not US
Indian families, generally like Asian ones and particularly like the Japanese, are hooked to banks as the preferred savings vehicle. The bank deposits to GDP ratio in India was 34 per cent in 1992, and is over 70 per cent now — doubling as a proportion of GDP. The Indian stock market yielded a compounded annual return of 14 per cent between 1991 and 2015. Despite that the people have queued up before banks to deposit their savings. The share of equities in the total savings stood at less than 2 per cent in seven out of the 11 years (2004 to 2014). It exceeded 3 per cent only in three years (2007 to 2008) when there was an unprecedented boom in the stock markets. In the four years ending fiscal 2014, the share of stocks in national savings has been less than 2 per cent.
Elite economic thinkers often fault Indian families, which seek safe investment models, as backward and unenlightened. Some even fault them for saving too much. In early 1990s, Dr Jagdish Bhagwati, the India-born US economist, advised the Indian government to make policies to cut family savings by half so their consumption spend would rise. Fortunately, Indian families defied his advice. Actually, as their incomes expanded, Indian families ramped up their savings but maintained their moderate consumption. They lived within their incomes and hardly borrowed to spend. This alone insulated India from the contagion effect of the global crisis in 2008. Had Indian families followed the prescription of experts, they would not have saved as much as they did, which dramatically increased the national investment and GDP. Nor would they have avoided debts that would have risked and even bankrupted them. Indian families compare favourably with Japanese households which too are habituated to save and, like Indians, are also addicted to keeping their savings in banks, not in risky stocks. The economists of the West used to deride the Japanese financial system as inefficient for this reason. But when the monetary crisis hit the West, the Bank of Japan had the last laugh and proudly claimed that the Japanese financial system was safe and sound unlike the Western.
In a paper published in the Bank of International Settlements Site (BIS paper no 46, May 2009) two officials of the Bank of Japan (Shinobu Nakagawa and Yosuke Yasui) wrote: “The average Japanese household has a financial balance sheet that is far more conservative” than that of households in West, with “cash and deposits” representing “half of total financial assets”. In contrast, the ratio for US households is only 16 per cent and in Europe, about one-fourth to one-third. The authors asked, “Why do Japanese households prefer deposits so much over more risky financial assets” when other financial instruments are well-developed and heavily traded in Japan, unlike in some other Asian markets? They answered, “the elderly Japanese were educated to believe that saving through bank deposits was a virtue”. They went on to assert “that the Japanese household sector, far from being a shock originator, is rather a shock absorber” even as they admitted that the risk is therefore “concentrated in the Japanese banking system”, which “continues to be a matter to resolve.”
This is precisely the Indian situation. The risk of financing business is on the Indian banks like it is on the banks in Japan. The Japanese banks, like the Indian ones, also have the same issue of Non-Performing Assets. How they handle the NPA problem will be relevant to India. But the RBI, prone to looking at the West, ignores the Japanese parallel, which is nearer to the Indian filial and financial system. With the result that the RBI is strangulating the Indian economy by applying Western standards when the nation is struggling to come out of almost a decade of economic destruction by the UPA, particularly UPA II. This is a topic by itself.
The author is a well-known commentator on economic and political affairs.
E-mail: guru@gurumurthy.net